Enterprise forms, ownership markets, and capital procurement of the firm. by Mikami, Kazuhiko
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper Series  
 
 
2007 – 2 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Royal Holloway College 
University of London 
Egham TW20 0EX 
 
 
 
 
 
©2007 Kazuhiko Mikami. Short sections of text, not to exceed two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit 
including © notice, is given to the source.
 
Enterprise forms, ownership markets, and
capital procurement of the firm1
Kazuhiko Mikami2
July 3, 2007
1The author would like to thank Hiroyuki Hashimoto, Kunihiko Ito, Johan
Lagerlof, Michael Mandler, Omer Moav, Alistair Munro, Tetsuya Tajima, Kazu-
fumi Ueno, and seminar participants at Royal Holloway College and University of
Hyogo for valuable comments.
2Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, University of London,
Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK (email: kazuhiko.mikami@rhul.ac.uk); and De-
partment of Applied Economics, University of Hyogo, Kobe, Hyogo, 651-2197,
Japan (email: mikami@econ.u-hyogo.ac.jp)
Abstract
It is often argued that cooperative ﬁrms are ﬁnancially less viable than
investor-owned ﬁrms. From a fundamental point of view, however, this does
not seem a fair comparison, since the market for ﬁrm ownership is usually
only available to investor-owned ﬁrms in our economy. This paper exam-
ines potential roles of the market for ownership rights to cooperative ﬁrms,
particularly in capital procurement of the ﬁrm. We show that, with a well-
functioning membership market, consumer cooperatives are not necessarily
ﬁnancially weaker than investor-owned ﬁrms. The consumer cooperative can
thus be a promising alternative to the investor-owned ﬁrm when the latter
type of the ﬁrm induces some serious market failure in the product market.
JEL codes: P13, P51
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1 Introduction
Despite their advantages in some important respects, cooperative ﬁrms have
occupied only a tiny fraction of the production sector in the market econ-
omy. In an early stage of capitalism, labor-managed ﬁrms were established
in various industries in an attempt to protect workers from factory owners’
exploitation [Mikami (2003)]. More recently, consumer cooperatives have
played a leading role in improving the quality, in particular safety, of food
and household goods [Mikami (2007)]. However, activities of these types of
ﬁrms have been quite limited so far. Presumably, one of the most funda-
mental weaknesses for cooperative ﬁrms consists in their ability of raising
funds for initial investment. The investor-owned ﬁrm is designed to embody
in it the mechanism of equity ﬁnance. This type of the ﬁrm issues a stock,
that represents partial ownership of the ﬁrm, and sells it in the stock market
to collect ﬁnancial capital for investment in physical capital. In contrast,
cooperative ﬁrms do no have such mechanisms of raising equity capital, and
have to resort in most part to debts to ﬁnance physical capital.
In theory, however, ownership of cooperative ﬁrms can also be traded in
the market, just as stocks are traded in the stock market. 1 This paper
studies potential roles of the primary (in contrast to secondary) market for
ownership rights to labor-managed ﬁrms and consumer cooperatives, where
special attention is paid to capital procurement of the ﬁrm.
As investor-owned ﬁrms issue stocks, labor-managed ﬁrms and consumer
cooperatives issue partnership and membership, respectively. As stocks are
traded in the stock market, partnership and membership are traded in the
partnership and membership markets, respectively. When the sales of owner-
1In reality, ownership rights to labor-managed ﬁrms and consumer cooperatives are
traded only in special occasions. Worker-partnership is traded in the US plywood industry,
where new applicants are supposed to buy worker-partnership from departing workers
[Craig and Pencavel (1992)]. Markets for consumer-membership are rather rare; however,
markets for membership in some golf courses and vacation resorts may be regarded as
markets for ownership rights to consumer cooperatives.
1
ship rights are expended on physical capital, the markets for ﬁrm ownership
constitute part of the ﬁnancial market of the economy. We thus have three
diﬀerent, symmetrically designed enterprise-market systems: the system of
investor-owned ﬁrms with the stock market, which we call the capitalistic sys-
tem; the system of labor-managed ﬁrms with the partnership market, which
we call the labor-managed system; and the system of consumer cooperatives
with the membership market, which we call the cooperative system.
We obtain some important results from the comparative study on these
diﬀerent enterprise-market systems. Firstly, if all the markets are complete,
the three systems are equally eﬃcient and proﬁtable (Propositions 1 and
2). Secondly, however, equity capital that is procured in the markets for
ﬁrm ownership is not equal among the three types of ﬁrms; it is greatest
for a consumer cooperative, second greatest for an investor-owned ﬁrm, and
smallest for a labor-managed ﬁrm (Proposition 3). This property has an
important implication when the ﬁnancial market is incomplete. That is,
if ﬁrm owners are privately informed of the project risk, adverse selection
may hinder outside investors from providing suﬃcient ﬁnancial capital to
the ﬁrm in the money market [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. In such circum-
stances, Proposition 3 implies that consumer cooperatives are ﬁnancially
more viable than investor-owned ﬁrms (Proposition 4). Thirdly, investor-
owned ﬁrms are more vulnerable to the market failure in the labor market
than labor-managed ﬁrms (Proposition 5); similarly, investor-owned ﬁrms are
more vulnerable to the market failure in the product market than consumer
cooperatives (Proposition 6). Referring to these theoretical results, the con-
sumer cooperative looms up as a promising alternative to the investor-owned
ﬁrm when the latter type of the ﬁrm induces serious market failure in the
product market.
The novelty of this paper can be described as follows. First of all, the
study of the partnership market for labor-managed ﬁrms is not new itself.
It has been discussed in the literature that an introduction of the market
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for partnership can eliminate ‘perversities’ of labor-managed ﬁrms [Sertel
(1991); Fehr (1993); Dow (1996)]. Although these works and ours share a
common idea of using the partnership market to restore eﬃciency of labor-
managed ﬁrms, there are major diﬀerences between the two. In principle, the
existing literature considered the secondary market for partnership, which,
in the absence of the labor market, aligns incentives of departing and incom-
ing partners of the ﬁrm. In this paper, on the other hand, we attempt to
examine implications of the primary market for partnership, which serves as
a complete substitute for the labor market. Such a diﬀerence in the expected
roles of the partnership market comes from how the labor-managed ﬁrm is
portrayed in the ﬁrst place. In the existing literature, labor-managed ﬁrms
are characterized as so-called Illyrian ﬁrms, where ineﬃciencies arise from the
behavioral assumption that the ﬁrms maximize the net income per worker.
In the present paper, on the other hand, labor-managed and investor-owned
ﬁrms are modeled symmetrically, where both types of ﬁrms are analogously
driven by the ﬁrm owners’ utility maximization. They are equally eﬃcient
in complete markets, and ineﬃciencies can emanate from exogeneously given
causes for market failure. Secondly, and more importantly, this paper dis-
cusses potential roles of the membership market for consumer cooperatives,
which has attracted little attention of economists so far.
The rest of the paper is constructed as follows. The next section presents
a model of the ﬁrm. Section 3 compares the three types of enterprise-market
systems under complete markets. Sections 4 and 5 explore the eﬀects of
market failure in the ﬁnancial and real markets, respectively. Section 6 sum-
marizes the results obtained in sections 3 through 5, and discusses some
extensions and remarks.
3
2 The model
Let N := {1, ..., n} be the set of households. Household i ∈ N has initial
wealth I
i
> 0. His preference is represented by a utility function of the form
ui =
m∑
j=1
(
aijv
i
j(x
i
j)− bijgij(lij)
)
+ I i (1)
where xij ≥ 0 is his consumption of good j = 1, ..., m, vij his utility from xij,
lij ≥ 0 his supply of labor to ﬁrm j = 1, ..., m, gij his disutility of lij, and I i his
money holdings. We assume that vij is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly
concave, and
lim
xij→0
dvij(x
i
j)
dxij
= +∞
and that gij is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly convex, and
lim
lij→0
dgij(l
i
j)
dlij
= 0.
aij takes either 1 or 0. If a
i
j = 1, household i will consume some positive
amount of good j. If aij = 0, he will not consume good j. Similarly, b
i
j takes
either 1 or 0. If bij = 1, household i will supply some positive amount of
labor to ﬁrm j. If bij = 0, he will not supply labor to ﬁrm j. Therefore, the
set of workers, N2j , and the set of customers, N
3
j , of ﬁrm j are given by
N2j := {i ∈ N : bij = 1}
and
N3j := {i ∈ N : aij = 1}
respectively.
There are m projects, j = 1, ..., m. Project j is undertaken by en-
trepreneur j. Project j requires a ﬁxed amount of project-speciﬁc physi-
cal capital, which costs κj > 0, and labor lj ≥ 0 to produce xj units of
consumption good j. The production technology is represented by
xj = fj(lj; κj) (2)
4
where fj is assumed continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave in lj for
given κj.
A project proceeds in two stages. In the investment stage (stage 0), en-
trepreneur j procures ﬁnancial capital for investment in physical capital. In
the production stage (stage 1), ﬁrm j produces good j according to produc-
tion function (2), which is consumed by households.
The investment stage is involved with investment risks. Investment j is
either safe with prior probability αj, 0 ≤ αj ≤ 1, or risky with 1− αj . For
simplicity, we assume that a safe investment succeeds for sure, and a risky
investment fails for sure. 2 If an investment fails, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc physical
capital is not usable and investment κj is not recouped by any means. In
addition, entrepreneur j incurs a suﬃciently large private cost of bankruptcy.
The production stage is involved with accident risks in the workplace and
in the consumption of the products. The workplace of ﬁrm j is either safe
with prior probability βj, 0 ≤ βj ≤ 1, or hazardous with 1−βj. No accidents
occur in a safe workplace, and an accident surely occurs in a hazardous
workplace. If an accident takes place in the workplace of ﬁrm j, household
i ∈ N2j incurs a loss yij > 0. In addition, entrepreneur j incurs a suﬃciently
large private cost from the accident. Similarly, good j is either safe with
prior probability γj , 0 ≤ γj ≤ 1, or hazardous with 1 − γj . No accidents
occur in consuming a safe good, and an accident surely occurs in consuming
a hazardous good. If an accident takes place in consuming good j, household
i ∈ N3j incurs a loss zij > 0. In addition, entrepreneur j incurs a suﬃciently
large private cost from the accident. 3
Let
U =
∑
i∈N
ui. (3)
2Therefore, production function (2) is for project j with a safe investment opportunity.
3Therefore, utility function (1) is for projects with safe workplaces and safe goods.
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4 Maximizing (3) subject to market clearing conditions,
∑
i x
i
j = xj and∑
i l
i
j = lj, and technological constraint (2) yields
gkj
′(lkj )
vhj
′(xhj )
= fj
′(lj; κj) (4)
for all h ∈ N3j and k ∈ N2j , j = 1, ..., m. (4) implies that the marginal rate
of substitution equals the marginal rate of technical transformation between
good j and the labor.
The entrepreneur has three ways to organize the ﬁrm.
Investor-owned ﬁrm. In the investment stage, entrepreneur j sells the
ﬁrm’s stock in the (primary) stock market to collect ﬁnancial capital for
investment. The stock is allocated to the public in proportion to the con-
tribution of ﬁnancial capital to the ﬁrm. Stockholders are the legal owners
of the ﬁrm and are entitled to receive the ﬁrm’s dividends as well as to hold
control rights to the ﬁrm. The latter includes the rights to decide a per-
formance pay for and replacement of the manager, and to decide how to
dispose of the ﬁrm’s remaining assets on dissolution. If the equity capital so
procured is in short of acquiring physical capital, entrepreneur j issues a debt
to complement the expenses. If the investment proves to be a success, in the
production stage, ﬁrm j hires labor in the labor market, produces good j,
sells it in the product market, redeems the debt (if any), and pays dividends
to the stockholders. In this paper, we call the system of investor-owned ﬁrms
combined with the stock market the capitalistic system. In the present con-
text, the stock market facilitates an arrangement to collect ﬁnancial capital
in advance, within the limit of the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt, in exchange for
cash payment from the ﬁrm’s earnings in the future.
Labor-managed ﬁrm. In the investment stage, entrepreneur j oﬀers the
ﬁrm’s partnership in the (primary) partnership market to secure labor that is
4(3) represents the social welfare when all the investment opportunities, workplaces
and products are of safe type.
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used in the production stage. 5 (In other words, households ‘buy’ partnership
with labor, not with money.) The partnership is allocated to the public in
proportion to the contribution of labor to the ﬁrm. Partners are the legal
owners of the ﬁrm and are entitled to receive cash distribution from the
ﬁrm’s earnings as well as to hold control rights to the ﬁrm. The latter
includes the rights to decide a performance pay for and replacement of the
manager, and to decide how to dispose of the ﬁrm’s remaining assets on
dissolution. Entrepreneur j procures all ﬁnancial capital for investment by
a debt. If the investment proves to be a success, in the production stage,
ﬁrm j produces good j, sells it in the product market, redeems the debt, and
makes cash distribution to the partners. We call the system of labor-managed
ﬁrms combined with the partnership market the labor-managed system. The
partnership market facilitates an arrangement to secure labor in advance in
exchange for cash payment from the ﬁrm’s earnings in the future.
Consumer cooperative. In the investment stage, entrepreneur j sells the
ﬁrm’s membership in the (primary) membership market to collect ﬁnancial
capital for investment. 6 The membership is allocated to the public in
proportion to the consumption of the ﬁrm’s product. Members are the legal
owners of the ﬁrm and are entitled to receive the ﬁrm’s product as well as
to hold control rights to the ﬁrm. The latter includes the rights to decide
a performance pay for and replacement of the manager, and to decide how
to dispose of the ﬁrm’s remaining assets on dissolution. If the investment
proves to be a success, in the production stage, ﬁrm j hires labor in the
labor market, produces good j and distributes it to the members. We call
the system of consumer cooperatives combined with the membership market
5Although the term ‘membership market’ seems commoner to refer to the market for
ownership for labor-managed ﬁrms, here we use the term ‘partnership market’ instead in
order to reserve the term for the market for ownership for consumer cooperatives.
6As it will be shown in Lemma 3.5, sales of membership cover the costs of physical
capital for a proﬁtable project. Therefore, the entrepreneur need not issue a debt to
ﬁnance physical capital.
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the cooperative system. The membership market facilitates an arrangement
to collect ﬁnancial capital in advance, within the limit of the value of the
product, in exchange for the distribution of the ﬁrm’s product in the future.
In order to focus on the eﬀects of ownership structure of the ﬁrm to the
eﬃciency of the enterprise-market systems, we assume that there is no agency
relationship between the entrepreneur, who will manage the ﬁrm, and the
ﬁrm owners, who have the ultimate rights to replace the manager [Manning
(1989); Ben-Ner and Jun (1996)]. We therefore consider the circumstance
where the entrepreneur and the ﬁrm owners share the private information on
the project type (i.e. the types of investment, workplace and the product.)
3 Enterprise-market systems with complete
markets
This section assumes complete markets (αj = βj = γj = 1) and compares the
three enterprise-market systems in economic eﬃciency, retained earnings of
the ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm’s procurement of equity capital. The results obtained
in this section will become the benchmark for the analysis of incomplete
markets in the next two sections.
3.1 The capitalistic system
Let θij be the amount of ﬁrm j’s stock that is held by household i. The set
of ﬁrm j’s stockholders is given by
N1j := {i ∈ N : θij > 0}.
θij units of ﬁrm j’s stock entitle household i ∈ N1j to a proﬁt and vote share
that is equal to θij/θj. Firm j’s proﬁt πj is deﬁned by
πj := pjxj − κj − wjlj (5)
8
where pj is the price of good j and wj the wage.
Let τj be the price of ﬁrm j’s stock in the (primary) stock market. A
household wishes to buy an inﬁnite amount of ﬁrm j’s stock if τj is lower
than the dividends per stock πj/θj, and does not buy any if τj is higher than
πj/θj. A household would buy an indeﬁnite amount of the stock if
τj =
πj
θj
. (6)
Therefore, the market for stock j can clear only if (6) holds. If this is the
case, in the investment stage, by issuing θj units of the stock, ﬁrm j raises
cash proceeds µj by
µj = τjθj = πj. (7)
If πj ≥ κj, ﬁrm j is able to ﬁnance the physical capital without resorting
to a debt. In the production stage, ﬁrm j earns revenue pjxj, expends wjlj
for labor costs, and pays pjxj − κj − wjlj to the stockholders as dividends.
Then, the ﬁrm is left with retained earnings ej by
ej = πj. (8)
A lump-sum reward to entrepreneur j is paid from (8).
If πj < κj, ﬁrm j issues a debt dj such that
πj + dj = κj
to ﬁnance the physical capital. 7 In the production stage, ﬁrm j earns
revenue pjxj and expends wjlj for labor costs. For simplicity, we assume
that the market interest rate is zero. Then, ﬁrm j pays dj(= κj−πj) back to
the lenders, where the discount factor for the loan is δj = 1. The ﬁrm pays
pjxj − κj − wjlj to the stockholders as dividends, and is left with retained
earnings (8). Again, a reward is paid to entrepreneur j from (8) in a lump-
sum manner.
7In response, households lend money dij ≥ 0 to ﬁrm j such that
∑
i∈N d
i
j = dj.
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Since retained earnings of the ﬁrm (8) are their common assets, stock-
holders will agree on maximizing the proﬁt (5) subject to the technological
constraint (2). This yields the ﬁrm’s supply function for good j, xj(wj/pj),
and the demand function for labor, lj(wj/pj ). From the ﬁrst-order condition
for proﬁt maximization, we obtain
fj
′(lj; κj) =
wj
pj
(9)
which implies that the marginal rate of technical transformation equals the
wage-price ratio.
Household i’s budget constraint is given by
∑
j
pja
i
jx
i
j + I
i =
∑
j
wjb
i
jl
i
j + I
i
. (10)
8 Maximizing (1) subject to (10) yields the demand function for good j,
xhj (pj) for h ∈ N3j , and the supply function of labor to ﬁrm j, lkj (wj) for
k ∈ N2j . From the ﬁrst-order conditions for utility maximization, we obtain
gkj
′(lkj )
vhj
′(xhj )
=
wj
pj
(11)
for h ∈ N3j and k ∈ N2j . (11) implies that the marginal rate of substitution
equals the wage-price ratio.
In equilibrium, demand equals supply for the product and labor, so that
∑
i∈N3j
xij(pj) = xj
(
wj
pj
)
(12)
8In fact, household i’s budget constraint is given by
∑
j
pja
i
jx
i
j +
∑
j
τjθ
i
j +
∑
j
dij + I
i =
∑
j
wjb
i
j l
i
j +
∑
j
(
θij
θj
)
πj +
∑
j
dij + I
i
.
Since τjθij = (θ
i
j/θj)πj by (6) and d
i
j is redeemed as it is, the budget constraint is reduced
to (10).
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and ∑
i∈N2j
lij(wj) = lj
(
wj
pj
)
. (13)
(12) and (13) yield the equilibrium price for the product and wage in the
capitalistic system,
(pKj , w
K
j ). (14)
Putting (14) back into (12) and (13) yields equilibrium quantities for the
product and labor, (xKj , l
K
j ). Referring to (5) and (14), let
πKj := p
K
j x
K
j − κj − wKj lKj .
We assume that
πKj > 0. (15)
Then, from (6), the equilibrium stock price is given by
τKj :=
πKj
θj
.
Also, retained earnings (8) and cash proceeds (7) in equilibrium are given by
eKj = µ
K
j = π
K
j = p
K
j x
K
j − κj − wKj lKj . (16)
Since (9) and (11) yield (4), we obtain the following property.
Lemma 3.1:
When αj = βj = γj = 1, the capitalistic system is eﬃcient.
3.2 The labor-managed system
The set of ﬁrm j’s partners is given by N2j . Let qj be ﬁrm j’s rate of cash
distribution to the partners in the (primary) partnership market. Then, lij
units of the partnership require partner i ∈ N2j to provide lij units of labor
11
to ﬁrm j, and entitle him to receive cash distribution qjl
i
j as well as to hold
an lij/lj vote share.
9 Firm j’s surplus sj is deﬁned by
sj := pjxj − κj − qjlj. (17)
In the investment stage, since it is labor, not ﬁnancial capital, that house-
holds provide to the ﬁrm in exchange for partnership, issuance of partnership
brings about ﬁrm j no cash proceeds,
µLj = 0. (18)
Therefore, ﬁrm j procures all ﬁnancial capital for investment by a debt dj,
dj = κj.
In the production stage, ﬁrm j earns revenue pjxj, redeems the debt
dj(= κj), and distributes the sum qjlj to the partners. The ﬁrm is then left
with retained earnings ej that coincide with the ﬁrm’s surplus (17),
ej = sj. (19)
A lump-sum reward is paid to the entrepreneur from (19).
Since retained earnings of the ﬁrm (19) are their common assets, partners
will agree on maximizing the surplus (17) subject to the technological con-
straint (2). This yields the ﬁrm’s supply function for good j, xj(qj/pj), and
the supply function for partnership, lj(qj/pj). From the ﬁrst-order condition
for surplus maximization, we obtain
fj
′(lj; κj) =
qj
pj
(20)
which implies that the marginal rate of technical transformation equals the
ratio of the rate of cash distribution to the product price.
9In other words, lij units of the partnership entitle partner i ∈ N2j to receive an lij/lj
share of cash distribution, where qjlj is the sum of ﬁrm j’s cash distribution to the partners.
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Household i’s budget constraint is given by
∑
j
pja
i
jx
i
j + I
i =
∑
j
qjb
i
jl
i
j + I
i
. (21)
Maximizing (1) subject to (21) yields the demand function for good j, xhj (pj)
for h ∈ N3j , and the demand function for ﬁrm j’s partnership, lkj (qj) for
k ∈ N2j . From the ﬁrst-order conditions for utility maximization, we obtain
gkj
′(lkj )
vhj
′(xhj )
=
qj
pj
(22)
for h ∈ N3j and k ∈ N2j . (22) implies that the marginal rate of substitution
equals the ratio of the rate of cash distribution to the product price.
In equilibrium, demand equals supply for the product and partnership,
so that ∑
i∈N3j
xij(pj) = xj
(
qj
pj
)
(23)
and ∑
i∈N2j
lij(qj) = lj
(
qj
pj
)
. (24)
(23) and (24) yield the equilibrium price for the product and rate of cash
distribution in the labor-managed system,
(pLj , q
L
j ). (25)
Lemma 3.2:
(pLj , q
L
j ) = (p
K
j , w
K
j ). (26)
Proof:
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In the system of simultaneous equations (12)-(13), xij(pj) solves v
i
j
′(xij) =
pj, l
i
j(wj) solves g
i
j
′(lij) = wj , lj(wj/pj) solves (9), and xj(wj/pj) = fj(lj(wj/pj), κj).
In the system of simultaneous equations (23)-(24), xij(pj) solves v
i
j
′(xij) = pj ,
lij(qj) solves g
i
j
′(lij) = qj, lj(qj/pj) solves (20), and xj(qj/pj) = fj(lj(qj/pj), κj).
Since functional forms for the two systems of simultaneous equations are
identical, we obtain (26). ‖
Putting (25) back into (23) and (24) yields equilibrium quantities for
the product and partnership, (xLj , l
L
j ). Referring to (17) and (25), retained
earnings (19) in equilibrium are given by
eLj = s
L
j := p
L
j x
L
j − κj − qLj lLj (27)
which is positive by (15) and (26).
Since (20) and (22) yield (4), we obtain the following property.
Lemma 3.3:
When αj = βj = γj = 1, the labor-managed system is eﬃcient.
3.3 The cooperative system
The set of ﬁrm j’s members is given by N3j . Let rj be the price of ﬁrm j’s
membership in the (primary) membership market. xij units of the member-
ship entitle household i ∈ N3j to receive xij units of ﬁrm j’s product as well
as to hold an xij/xj vote share.
10 Firm j’s surplus tj is deﬁned by
tj := rjxj − κj − wjlj. (28)
In the investment stage, by issuing xj units of the membership, ﬁrm j
raises cash proceeds µj by
µj = rjxj. (29)
10In other words, xij units of the membership entitle member i ∈ N3j to receive an xij/xj
share of the total quantity of the product, xj .
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Suppose that
µj ≥ κj . (30)
Then, ﬁrm j is able to ﬁnance κj without resorting to a debt. In the produc-
tion stage, ﬁrm j expends wjlj for labor costs and distributes the product to
the members. The ﬁrm is then left with retained earnings ej which coincide
with the ﬁrm’s surplus,
ej = tj. (31)
A lump-sum reward is paid to entrepreneur j from (31).
Since retained earnings of the ﬁrm (31) are their common assets, members
will agree on maximizing the surplus (28) subject to the technological con-
straint (2). This yields the ﬁrm’s supply function for membership, xj(wj/rj),
and the demand function for labor, lj(wj/rj). From the ﬁrst-order condition
for surplus maximization, we obtain
fj
′(lj; κj) =
wj
rj
(32)
which implies that the marginal rate of technical transformation equals the
wage-price ratio.
Household i’s budget constraint is given by
∑
j
rja
i
jx
i
j + I
i =
∑
j
wjb
i
jl
i
j + I
i
. (33)
Maximizing (1) subject to (33) yields the demand function for ﬁrm j’s mem-
bership, xhj (pj) for h ∈ N3j , and the supply function of labor to ﬁrm j, lkj (wj)
for k ∈ N2j . From the ﬁrst-order conditions for utility maximization, we
obtain
gkj
′(lkj )
vhj
′(xhj )
=
wj
rj
(34)
for h ∈ NCj and k ∈ NWj . (34) implies that the marginal rate of substitution
equals the wage-price ratio.
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In equilibrium, demand equals supply for the membership and labor, so
that ∑
i∈N3j
xij(rj) = xj
(
wj
rj
)
(35)
and ∑
i∈N2j
lij(wj) = lj
(
wj
rj
)
. (36)
(35) and (36) yield the equilibrium price for the membership and wage in the
cooperative system,
(rCj , w
C
j ). (37)
Lemma 3.4:
(rCj , w
C
j ) = (p
K
j , w
K
j ). (38)
Proof:
In the system of simultaneous equations (12)-(13), xij(pj) solves v
i
j
′(xij) =
pj, l
i
j(wj) solves g
i
j
′(lij) = wj , lj(wj/pj) solves (9), and xj(wj/pj) = fj(lj(wj/pj), κj).
In the system of simultaneous equations (35)-(36), xij(rj) solves v
i
j
′(xij) = rj,
lij(wj) solves g
i
j
′(lij) = wj, lj(wj/rj) solves (32), and xj(wj/rj) = fj(lj(wj/rj), κj).
Since functional forms for the two systems of simultaneous equations are
identical, we obtain (38). ‖
Putting (37) back into (35) and (36) yields equilibrium quantities for the
membership and labor, (xCj , l
C
j ). Referring to (28) and (37), retained earnings
(31) and cash proceeds (29) in equilibrium are given by
eCj = t
C
j := r
C
j x
C
j − κj − wCj lCj (39)
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and
µCj = r
C
j x
C
j (40)
respectively.
Lemma 3.5:
µCj > κj . (41)
Proof:
It holds from (15) and (38) that rCj x
C
j − κj − wCj lCj > 0, which implies
(41). ‖
(30) thus holds true in equilibrium, and the consumer cooperative does not
issue a debt for initial investment.
Since (32) and (34) yield (4), we obtain the following property.
Lemma 3.6:
When αj = βj = γj = 1, the cooperative system is eﬃcient.
3.4 Comparison
Proposition 1:
Suppose that αj = βj = γj = 1. Then, the capitalistic, labor-managed
and cooperative systems are all eﬃcient.
Proof:
The property directly follows from Lemmas 3.1, 3.3 and 3.6. ‖
Proposition 2:
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Suppose that αj = βj = γj = 1, Then,
eKj = e
L
j = e
C
j .
Proof:
With (26) and (38), the property follows from (16), (27) and (39). ‖
Proposition 1 states that labor-managed ﬁrms and consumer coopera-
tives are intrinsically as eﬃcient as investor-owned ﬁrms if the markets for
partnership and membership exist and function well. In addition, as Propo-
sition 2 insists, since ﬁrm j produces an equal amount of retained earnings by
being organized as an investor-owned ﬁrm, a labor-managed ﬁrm and a con-
sumer cooperative, there are equal incentives to establish the three types of
ﬁrms. Hence, the enterprise-market system does not matter under complete
markets.
Obviously, this is not what we observe in the real economy, where various
causes of market failure prevent an economic system from working eﬃciently.
The following property is important when we think of the failure of the
ﬁnancial market in the next section.
Proposition 3:
Suppose that αj = βj = γj = 1, Then,
µCj > µ
K
j > µ
L
j . (42)
Proof:
With (26) and (38), the property follows from (16), (18) and (40). ‖
Intuitively, the ﬁrst inequality of (42) may be interpreted as follows. An
investor-owned ﬁrm raises equity capital up to the amount of its proﬁt, which
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equals revenue minus costs. A consumer cooperative raises equity capital up
to the amount of its revenue, which by deﬁnition exceeds the proﬁt for an
investor-owned ﬁrm.
4 Failure in the financial market
This section introduces an investment risk (αj < 1) to the model and exam-
ines its implications to the eﬃciency of enterprise-market systems. We think
of the case that investment for project j is safe, although potential existence
of the risky type leaves uncertainties to the individuals outside the ﬁrm. 11
In order to focus on the eﬀects of asymmetric information in the ﬁnancial
market, we assume that βj = γj = 1.
4.1 The capitalistic system
In the investment stage, since the type of investment is known to households
in N1j , ﬁrm j collects cash proceeds (7) just as it does under complete markets.
If πj ≥ κj, ﬁrm j acquires physical capital without resorting to a debt.
Once investment is made successfully, no more uncertainties remain in the
production stage. Hence, the rest of the transactions proceeds in the same
way as in subsection 3.1, and eﬃcient equilibrium (14) is sustained.
If πj < κj, ﬁrm j issues an internal debt d˜j to its stockholders and an
external debt dˆj to the outside investors such that
πj + d˜j + dˆj = κj.
Stockholders know that the investment is safe and claim no surcharges on
their loan. The discount factor for d˜j is therefore δ˜j = 1. Let Rj be the
return on dˆj . Since outside investors expect to receive αjRj , ﬁrm j oﬀers
Rj = dˆj/αj for the external debt dˆj, where δˆj = αj is the discount factor.
11Because of the private cost of bankruptcy to the entrepreneur, a risky investment will
not be undertaken.
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Firm j therefore has to incur a surcharge
Rj − dˆj = 1− αj
αj
dˆj
on the external debt dˆj. Again, once investment is made successfully, no
uncertainties remain in the production stage, and ﬁrm j is left with retained
earnings
ej = πj − 1− αj
αj
(κj − πj − d˜j). (43)
Firm j therefore maximizes the (gross) proﬁt (5), and the rest of the
transactions proceeds in the same way as in subsection 3.1. Hence, if
πKj −
1− αj
αj
(κj − πKj − d˜j) > 0 (44)
ﬁrm j carries out production and eﬃcient equilibrium (14) is sustained. On
the other hand, if
πKj −
1− αj
αj
(κj − πKj − d˜j) ≤ 0 (45)
ﬁrm j withdraws from the market. The capitalistic system is ineﬃcient in
this case in the sense that a socially proﬁtable project is not undertaken.
We summarize these results in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1:
Suppose that αj < 1 and βj = γj = 1. When π
K
j ≥ κj, the capitalistic
system is eﬃcient. When πKj < κj, the capitalistic system is eﬃcient if (44)
holds, and ineﬃcient if (45) holds.
When ﬁnancial capital is provided to the ﬁrm through the stock market,
private information on the type of investment is conveyed to the investors.
When it is provided to the ﬁrm through the money market, the private in-
formation is withheld from the investors. Hence, if the equity capital does
not cover the costs of investment, adverse selection may prevent the ﬁrm
from raising suﬃcient funds for investment in the money market, where un-
informed investors are reluctant to lend money to the ﬁrm fearing that the
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investment can be risky. In that case, the ﬁrm is obliged to withdraw from
the market and the socially proﬁtable project is not undertaken.
4.2 The labor-managed system
In the investment stage, since µj = 0, ﬁrm j issues an internal debt d˜j to
its partners with the discount factor δ˜j = 1, and an external debt dˆj to the
outside investors with the discount factor δˆj = αj, such that
d˜j + dˆj = κj.
By the same reason as in subsection 4.1, in the production stage, ﬁrm j is
left with retained earnings
ej = sj − 1− αj
αj
(κj − d˜j). (46)
Firm j therefore maximizes the (gross) surplus (17). Then, if
sLj −
1− αj
αj
(κj − d˜j) > 0 (47)
ﬁrm j carries out production and eﬃcient equilibrium (25) is sustained. If
sLj −
1− αj
αj
(κj − d˜j) ≤ 0 (48)
ﬁrm j withdraws from the market. The labor-managed system is ineﬃcient
in this case.
Lemma 4.2:
Suppose that αj < 1 and βj = γj = 1. The labor-managed system is
eﬃcient if (47) holds, and ineﬃcient if (48) holds.
It is often argued that wealth constraint of workers is a major weakness
for a labor-managed ﬁrm [Dow (2001)]. In our model, notice that
d˜j ≤
∑
i∈N2j
I
i
.
21
The less wealthy the workers are, and hence the more the ﬁrm has to rely
on an external debt, the more likely adverse selection occurs in the money
market and proﬁtable labor-managed ﬁrms are crowded out by unproﬁtable
ones [Mikami and Tanaka (2004)].
4.3 The cooperative system
In the investment stage, since the type of investment is known to households
in N3j , ﬁrm j collects cash proceeds (29) just as it does under complete
markets. Once investment is made successfully, no more uncertainties remain
in the production stage. Hence, the eﬃcient equilibrium (37) is sustained.
Lemma 4.3:
When αj < 1 and βj = γj = 1, the cooperative system is eﬃcient.
4.4 Comparison
Proposition 4 (Investment risks):
Suppose that αj < 1 and βj = γj = 1.
(a) When πKj ≥ κj , the capitalistic system is eﬃcient. When πKj < κj, it
is eﬃcient if (44) holds, and ineﬃcient if (45) holds.
(b) The labor-managed system is eﬃcient if (47) holds, and ineﬃcient if
(48) holds.
(c) The cooperative system is always eﬃcient.
Proof:
The property directly follows from Lemmas 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. ‖
Proposition 4 is shown in the second column of Table 1.
An essential diﬀerence between the costs of physical capital and other
costs such as labor costs is that the former costs have to be paid before
the value of the project realizes (i.e. in the investment stage), whereas the
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latter costs can be paid when the value is created (i.e. in the production
stage). Therefore, if the ﬁnancial market is incomplete, the ﬁrm’s ability to
procure equity capital in advance (i.e. in the investment stage) matters to its
eﬃciency. Since ﬁrms can raise more equity capital by issuing membership
than by issuing stocks, it turns out that consumer cooperatives are ﬁnancially
more viable than investor-owned ﬁrms.
5 Failure in the real markets
This section introduces into the model uncertainties about (a) workplace
safety (βj < 1, αj = γj = 1), and (b) product safety (γj < 1, αj = βj = 1).
In both circumstances, we think of the case that project j is of safe type,
although potential existence of a hazardous type leaves uncertainties to the
individuals outside the ﬁrm. 12 13
5.1 The capitalistic system
Workplace safety
Suppose that initial investment is made and production of good j takes
place. Since household i ∈ N2j \N1j is not informed of the type of workplace in
ﬁrm j, his payoﬀs from providing lij > 0 units of labor to ﬁrm j are wjl
i
j−gij(lij)
with probability βj, and wjl
i
j−gij(lij)−yij with probability 1−βj. His expected
payoﬀs ζ ij are therefore given by
ζ ij(wj, l
i
j) := wjl
i
j − gij(lij)− (1− βj)yij. (49)
Maximizing (49) with respect to lij yields household i’s supply function of
labor such that lij = l
i
j(wj) if ζ
i
j(wj, l
i
j(wj)) ≥ 0 and lij = 0 otherwise. Then,
if
wKj l
i
j(w
K
j )− gij(lij(wKj ))− (1− βj)yij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N2j \N1j (50)
12Because of the private cost of an accident to the entrepreneur, a hazardous project
will not be undertaken.
13In principle, discussion in this section holds true even in the absence of the partnership
and membership markets [Mikami (2007)].
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all households in N2j continue to work in ﬁrm j. By backward induction,
initial investment will be made, and eﬃcient equilibrium (14) is sustained.
On the other hand, if
wKj l
i
j(w
K
j )− gij(lij(wKj ))− (1− βj)yij < 0 ∃i ∈ N2j \N1j (51)
some households in N2j \ N1j decline to work in ﬁrm j. Equilibrium (14) is
thus not sustained and the capitalistic system is ineﬃcient. 14
Lemma 5.1
Suppose that βj < 1 and αj = γj = 1. The capitalistic system is eﬃcient
if (50) holds, and ineﬃcient if (51) holds.
(51) implies adverse selection in the labor market, in which uninformed
workers hesitate to work in the ﬁrm, which in fact has a safe workplace,
fearing that it can be hazardous. 15
Product safety
Suppose that initial investment is made and production of good j takes
place. Since household i ∈ N3j \ N1j is not informed of the type of good j,
his payoﬀs from consuming xij > 0 units of good j are v
i
j(x
i
j) − pjxij with
probability γj, and v
i
j(x
i
j) − pjxij − zij with probability 1− γj . His expected
payoﬀs ξij are therefore given by
ξij(pj , x
i
j) := v
i
j(x
i
j)− pjxij − (1− γj)zij. (52)
Maximizing (52) with respect to xij yields household i’s demand function for
good j such that xij = x
i
j(pj) if ξ
i
j(pj, x
i
j(pj)) ≥ 0 and xij = 0 otherwise.
14In this case, initial investment may not be made in the ﬁrst place.
15Investor-owned ﬁrms are motivated to adopt production processes that reduce the
costs of production at the sacriﬁce of the safety of workers. For example, despite of its
well-known risks to the human body, asbestos had been widely used in industries as an
economical insulation material. Companies that dealt with asbestos did not take eﬀective
measures, such as introducing dust collectors to the factories or providing workers with
dust protective masks. The lack of eﬀective measures in factories has caused illnesses on
ex-workers such as lung cancer and other serious respiratory problems. Other examples
include safety measures taken in coal mines in China.
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Then, if
vij(x
i
j(p
K
j ))− pKj xij(pKj )− (1− γj)zij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N3j \N1j (53)
all households in N3j continue to consume good j. By backward induction,
initial investment will be made, and eﬃcient equilibrium (14) is sustained.
On the other hand, if
vij(x
i
j(p
K
j ))− pKj xij(pKj )− (1− γj)zij < 0 ∃i ∈ N3j \N1j (54)
some households in N3j \N1j decline to buy good j. Equilibrium (14) is thus
not sustained and the capitalistic system is ineﬃcient. 16
Lemma 5.2
Suppose that γj < 1 and αj = βj = 1. The capitalistic system is eﬃcient
if (53) holds, and ineﬃcient if (54) holds.
(54) implies adverse selection in the product market, in which uninformed
customers hesitate to buy the ﬁrm’s product, which in fact is safe, fearing
that it can be hazardous. 17
5.2 The labor-managed system
Workplace safety
Since the workers know that the workplace is safe, transactions in the
production stage proceed in the same way as under complete markets. Since
16In this case, initial investment may not be made in the ﬁrst place.
17When the safety of goods is not observable and it costs the ﬁrms to maintain the safety
level, investor-owned ﬁrms may intentionally provide consumers with unsafe products and
the consumers are necessarily exposed to potential risks of accidents. For instance, in the
well-known drug scandal in 1980s, major pharmaceutical companies kept supplying blood
products for proﬁt that they reasonably doubted could be tainted with HIV-viruses. For
other examples, mishaps in air, railroad and road transport are often attributed to the
ﬁrm’s excess emphasis on proﬁt. Also, it is observed that likelihood of clinical negligence
rises when hospitals are pressed to decrease the number of staﬀ in an attempt to reduce
deﬁcit. A formal study on the product safety in relation to the enterprise form is found
in Mikami (2007).
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there are no uncertainties in the investment stage, initial investment is made
successfully. Equilibrium (25) is thus sustained and the labor-managed sys-
tem is eﬃcient.
Lemma 5.3
When βj < 1 and αj = γj = 1, the labor-managed system is eﬃcient.
The labor-managed system owes its success in this case to the use of the
partnership market, which conveys private information on the type of the
workplace to the workers, instead of the labor market, which withholds the
information from the workers.
Product safety
The eﬀects of the risk of products in the labor-managed system are the
same as those in the capitalistic system discussed in subsection 5.1.
Suppose that initial investment is made and production of good j takes
place. Since household i ∈ N3j \ N2j is not informed of the type of good j,
his expected payoﬀs from consuming good j are given by (52). Maximizing
(52) with respect to xij yields household i’s demand function for good j such
that xij = x
i
j(pj) if ξ
i
j(pj , x
i
j(pj)) ≥ 0 and xij = 0 otherwise. Then, if
vij(x
i
j(p
L
j ))− pLj xij(pLj )− (1− γj)zij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N3j \N2j (55)
eﬃcient equilibrium (25) is sustained. If
vij(x
i
j(p
L
j ))− pLj xij(pLj )− (1− γj)zij < 0 ∃i ∈ N3j \N2j (56)
equilibrium (25) is not sustained and the labor-managed system is ineﬃcient.
Lemma 5.4
Suppose that γj < 1 and αj = βj = 1. The labor-managed system is
eﬃcient if (55) holds, and ineﬃcient if (56) holds.
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5.3 The cooperative system
Workplace safety
The eﬀects of the risk of workplaces in the cooperative system are the
same as those in the capitalistic system discussed in subsection 5.1.
Suppose that initial investment is made and production of good j takes
place. Since household i ∈ N2j \N3j is not informed of the type of workplace
in ﬁrm j, his expected payoﬀs from providing labor to ﬁrm j are given by
(49). Maximizing (49) with respect to lij yields supply function of labor such
that lij = l
i
j(wj) if ζ
i
j(wj, l
i
j(wj)) ≥ 0 and lij = 0 otherwise. Then, if
wCj l
i
j(w
C
j )− gij(lij(wCj ))− (1− βj)yij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N2j \N3j (57)
eﬃcient equilibrium (37) is sustained. If
wCj l
i
j(w
C
j )− gij(lij(wCj ))− (1− βj)yij < 0 ∃i ∈ N2j \N3j (58)
equilibrium (37) is not sustained and the cooperative system is ineﬃcient.
Lemma 5.5
Suppose that γj < 1 and αj = βj = 1. The cooperative system is eﬃcient
if (57) holds, and ineﬃcient if (58) holds.
Product safety
Since the customers know that the product is safe, transactions in the
production stage proceed in the same way as under complete markets. Since
there are no uncertainties in the investment stage, initial investment is made
successfully. Equilibrium (37) is thus sustained and the cooperative system
is eﬃcient.
Lemma 5.6
When γj < 1 and αj = βj = 1, the cooperative system is eﬃcient.
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The cooperative system owes its success in this case to the use of the
membership market, which conveys private information on the type of the
product to the customers, instead of the product market, which withholds
the information from the customers.
5.4 Comparison
Proposition 5 (Workplace safety):
Suppose that βj < 1 and αj = γj = 1.
(a) The capitalistic system is eﬃcient if (50) holds, and ineﬃcient if (51)
holds.
(b) The labor-managed system is always eﬃcient.
(c) The cooperative system is eﬃcient if (57) holds, and ineﬃcient if (58)
holds.
Proof:
The property follows from Lemmas 5.1, 5.3 and 5.5. ‖
Proposition 6 (Product safety):
Suppose that γj < 1 and αj = βj = 1.
(a) The capitalistic system is eﬃcient if (53) holds, and ineﬃcient if (54)
holds.
(b) The labor-managed system is eﬃcient if (55) holds, and ineﬃcient if
(56) holds.
(c) The cooperative system is always eﬃcient.
Proof:
The property follows from Lemmas 5.2, 5.4 and 5.6. ‖
Propositions 5 and 6 are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table
1, respectively.
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If workplace safety is more important than product safety, worker owner-
ship is better than customer ownership for the ﬁrm, and vice versa. In any
case, when safety of workplaces or products is the major concern, there seem
no reasons to choose investor ownership.
6 Conclusion
6.1 Summary
The equivalence results obtained in section 3 suggest that, in theory, labor-
managed ﬁrms and consumer cooperatives are as eﬃcient, and also as prof-
itable, as investor-owned ﬁrms in the presence of the corresponding market
for ﬁrm ownership (Propositions 1 and 2).
Enterprise forms do matter in the economy with market failure. We
ﬁrst pointed out that consumer cooperatives, which issue membership, can
procure more equity capital than investor-owned ﬁrms, which issue stocks
(Proposition 3). This is because investor-owned ﬁrms collect equity capital
in advance in return for the dividends from the proﬁt in the future, whereas
consumer cooperatives do so in return for the distribution of the product in
the future. Therefore, when asymmetric information on project risks works
in favor of equity ﬁnance rather than debt ﬁnance, the consumer cooperative
turns out to be a ﬁnancially more viable institution than the investor-owned
ﬁrm (Proposition 4; Table 1, Column 2). As for transactions of products,
we showed that the cooperative system outperforms the capitalistic system
when opportunistic behavior of investor-owned ﬁrms undermines eﬃciency
of the product market (Proposition 6; Table 1, Column 4).
A negligible market share of consumer cooperatives in our economy may
be due in part to the absence of a proper market for their ownership. Our
theoretical results suggest that, with a well-functioning membership market,
the consumer cooperative is potentially no less a lucrative corporate form
than the investor-owned ﬁrm in the market economy.
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6.2 Extensions and remarks
The secondary market for ﬁrm ownership
In this paper, we constructed a one-period model of the ﬁrm and examined
the roles of the primary markets for ﬁrm ownership. In order to study the
function of the secondary markets for ﬁrm ownership, we need to extend
the model to one with a multi-period framework. Let us brieﬂy consider
this question in the simplest possible case where physical capital does not
depreciate over time and the ﬁrm continues to exist permanently.
In the capitalistic system, if an investor buys the stock of an investor-
owned ﬁrm in the primary stock market, he expects to receive the ﬁrm’s
dividends every year from that time. If he wishes, he can resell his stock
in the secondary stock market at the price that is equal to the discounted
present value of the stream of dividends paid by the investor-owned ﬁrm
thereafter.
The secondary membership market would work just in a similar way in
the cooperative system. If a consumer buys the membership of a consumer
cooperative in the primary membership market, he expects to receive the
ﬁrm’s product every year from that time. If he wishes, he can resell his
membership in the secondary membership market at the price that matches
the discounted present utility from the stream of the product delivered by
the consumer cooperative thereafter.
In a sense, the membership market of this kind resembles the housing
market. If one buys a new house in the primary housing market, he can
enjoy the residential services that arise from the house from that day on.
If he wishes, he can resell the house in the secondary housing market at
the price that matches the discounted present utility from the stream of the
residential services produced by the house thereafter.
Hence, in theory, the secondary membership market works in the coop-
erative system just as the secondary stock market does in the capitalistic
30
system. The only diﬀerence between them is that a stock generates a stream
of cash ﬂow whereas membership generates a stream of real goods and ser-
vices. The presence of the housing market in our economy may suggest that
the market for the latter type of securities could function well in the market
economy.
The cooperative system with intermediaries
In our economy, transactions between the industry and household sec-
tors are often facilitated by intermediary institutions, such as banks, mutual
funds, real estate agents, wholesalers and retailers. We here examine a pos-
sible conﬁguration of such an intermediary institution in the cooperative
system.
Let us begin the discussion by reviewing the relationship between trans-
actions of ﬁrm ownership and transactions of real goods and services in the
three enterprise-market systems. An essential diﬀerence between the capital-
istic system and the other two systems is that, transactions of ﬁrm ownership
are separated from transactions of goods and services in the former system,
whereas they are tied together in the latter systems. In the capitalistic sys-
tem, households supply ﬁnancial capital to the ﬁrm in exchange for the ﬁrm
ownership (i.e. the stock), which is independent of their supply of labor
to the ﬁrm or demand for the ﬁrm’s product. We will call this property
disjunction of the market for ﬁrm ownership and the transactions of goods
and services. Indeed, we may assert that the investor-owned ﬁrm is an in-
vention to separate ﬁrm ownership from the transactions of real goods and
services. In contrast, in the labor-managed system, households supply labor
to the ﬁrm in exchange for the ﬁrm ownership (i.e. the partnership), which
depends proportionately on the quantity of labor they supply to the ﬁrm.
Similarly, in the cooperative system, households supply ﬁnancial capital to
the ﬁrm in exchange for the ﬁrm ownership (i.e. the membership), which
depends proportionately on the quantity of the ﬁrm’s product they consume.
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We will call this property conjunction of the market for ﬁrm ownership and
the transactions of goods and services.
We thus may well predict that, in the capitalistic system, intermediaries
that help transact ﬁrm ownership are necessarily pure ﬁnancial institutions.
In reality, various types of ﬁnancial intermediaries help the trade in stocks.
For example, a mutual fund collects ﬁnancial capital from households, in-
vests the sum in stocks and other securities, and distributes the proceeds
from investment back to the households. Often, the mutual fund holds the
voting rights for the investor-owned ﬁrms and casts them at the shareholders’
meetings on behalf of the investors.
In the cooperative system, on the other hand, an intermediary that helps
transact ﬁrm ownership would naturally play both roles of a ﬁnancial insti-
tution and a distributor of real goods and services. Such an organization
— which we may call a ‘credit-retail union’ — would collect ﬁnancial capital
from households, invest the sum in membership of (manufacturing) consumer
cooperatives, receive their products, and distribute them to the households.
It would retain the voting rights for the consumer cooperatives and cast them
at the members’ meetings on behalf of the households.
Coexistence of diﬀerent systems and generalization of the business law
In our model, the labor-managed and cooperative systems can coexist
consistently with the capitalistic system. Entrepreneurs can choose the sys-
tem in which their ﬁrms incorporate according to the possible market failure
the ﬁrms will face. Firms with diﬀerent ownership structure and markets
for ﬁrm ownership thus coexist in one economy. It would be an interesting
extension of the model to generalize utility function (1) so that it allows
interrelation between goods and services that are produced in diﬀerent sys-
tems.
The description of the three types of ﬁrms — investor-owned ﬁrm, labor-
managed ﬁrm and consumer cooperative — gives us a useful insight how
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the business law that mainly assumes investor ownership of the ﬁrm can
be extended to include the other types of ﬁrms. In our model, a labor-
managed ﬁrm is characterized as a ﬁrm in which ﬁrm owners are supposed
to contribute labor (which is real goods and services) and receive cash ﬂow
as the distribution of the ﬁrm’s surplus. If the business law is amended to
allow investors of labor (instead of money) to become the ﬁrm’s shareholders,
labor-managed ﬁrms can be incorporated within the current framework of the
law. Similarly, we characterized a consumer cooperative as a ﬁrm in which
ﬁrm owners are supposed to contribute money and receive distribution of
the ﬁrm’s products, which is real goods and services. If the business law
allows dividends in the form of the ﬁrm’s products, consumer cooperatives
can be consistently incorporated within the framework of the law. Thus,
current business laws become applicable to both labor-managed ﬁrms and
consumer cooperatives by allowing investment and dividends with real goods
and services. In principle, no brand new legislation is necessary for the labor-
managed and cooperative systems to start in our economy.
Risk diversiﬁcation
In this paper, we did not discuss the aspect of risk diversiﬁcation, which
is another important factor to determine comparative eﬃciency of enterprise-
market systems.
In the capitalistic system, shareholders can diversify project risks by in-
vesting in many diﬀerent ﬁrms. Apparently, the labor-managed system is
handicapped in this respect. In order to diversify project risks, workers have
to divide their labor and work for several ﬁrms. In many occasions, however,
it is eﬃcient that a worker works for a single ﬁrm for an extended period of
time in order to develop ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. The cooperative sys-
tem seems to be in a much better position for this point. A household may
well be the customer of several consumer cooperatives at the same time, thus
reasonably diversifying project risks.
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Table 1 
Vulnerability of enterprise-market systems to market failure 
 
 
 Failure of the 
financial market 
(Proposition 4) 
Failure of the labor 
market 
(Proposition 5) 
Failure of the product 
market 
(Proposition 6) 
Capitalistic 
system 
△ × × 
Labor-managed 
system 
× ○ × 
Cooperative 
system 
○ × ○ 
 
○: Immune to the market failure 
△: Immune or vulnerable to the market failure (that depends) 
×: Vulnerable to the market failure 
 
